A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s.

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Political action committees

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A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s.

Joseph P. McGarrity [*]

Daniel Sutter [+]

We examine roll call votes on gun control in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s to determine whether political action committees (PACs) make spot market purchases, prepay for votes in the prior election cycle, or make long-term investments. Previous tests generally employ PAC contributions from only one cycle, which could impose the wrong structure on contracts between PACs and politicians, causing researchers to misestimate a contribution's impact. We find that money from more than one election cycle influences roll call votes, which suggests that PAC expenditures are not simple spot market or one-period prepayment contracts. Most remarkably, we find that the National Rifle Association buys votes with contributions from three election cycles.

Enactment of the bill was a major victory for the National Rifle Association, which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark Gun Control Act of 1968.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1986, p. 82)

1. Introduction

Every election the same political action committees (PACs) contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office. Well-informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money. Yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes. [1]

A mischaracterization of the exchange between PACs and politicians may produce these contradictory results. Empirical studies of roll call voting typically use PAC contributions from only one election cycle. Earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior Congress, while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange. Recent empirical work, however, suggests another possibility: Interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles. Stratmann (1995) shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports. Snyder (1990, 1992) presents evidence that interest groups make long-term investments in politicians. Previous studies, by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure, may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of PAC money on legislative votes.

We examine roll call votes on gun control in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s to determine whether PACs make spot market purchases, prepay for votes in the prior election cycle, or make long-term investments. We investigate whether PAC contributions have a durable, long-term investment effect, as Snyder (1992) suggests. We consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract. First, we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control: the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Hand Gun Control (HGC). Their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis: Both groups made significant...

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