Summary
[...] the fashion in which the ruling Junta under General Galtieri submitted to a navy plan to secure Las Malvinas in 1982, in exchange for political support, seems to suggest that militaries do and can assert almost altruistic national goals when they are permitted to select their own missions. If it is true that to some extent military regimes are responses to dangerous international environment, they may be the optimal form of governance for a state seeking survival (Aron 1979; Hintze 1975).
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Military Diversion in the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania War
Particularly in politically undermobilized societies, the elite's popularity in the general population is often less important than the loyalty of the military to their rale. Elites maintain power by managing militaries through a variety of instruments including nationalism and coup-proofing, and when those fail, they can appeal to the organizational interests of militaries to carry out their primary mission of war. In instances of mercenary armies, the rally-around-the-flag effect is inelevant, whereas aggrandizement through territorial conquest, booty and glory are more alluring.
We argue that civilian and military regimes will not normally divert militaries over which they have some control. However, as the magnitude of the loss of control of a military by the elite increases, so does the propensity of the elite to engage in diversion. Elites do this by trading military support for permission for the military to pursue policies prefened by its organisational interests. These interests are a combination of normative (learned) and structural preferences, and usually involve the military preparing or acting against an assumed enemy. Minor losses of control by the ruling elite will manifest themselves as demonstrations of force against external targets. Major losses of control can result in the pursuit of territorial goals of the military, resulting in war. Poorly timed major losses of control can result in a military coup, military infighting or civil war.Our discussion proceeds in three parts. In parts one and two we survey the literature and propose a theory of military diversion. In part three we test this theory in the case of the Ugandan invasion of the Kagera salient in October of 1978.DIVERSION AND THE MILITARYDiversion is the threatened or actual use of force against an exaggerated external threat to distract a domestic constituency in order to enhance an elite's probability of continued rule. When faced with a crisis, elites may choose to give in to public demands (usually by vacating office), to suppress the populace, or to engage in diversion (Gelpi 1997:260). There are three general motives for an elite to engage in diversionary policies. First, is to divert the attention of a population from an unpopular problem by scapegoating its responsibility to an out-group. Second, to increase cohesion by exaggerating an out-group threat. Third, to show resolve in a dispute and increase one's popularity (Heldt 1999: 454). Out...See the full content of this document
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