Summary
This is a case study of a failed Department of Defense (DOD) project, even though it was fully justified and badly needed. Project management within the DOD is a complicated process. Projects are beset by the agenda of various stakeholders within the DOD organizational structure. When this occurs, strong project management leadership is necessary for success. This paper analyzes the potential causes of the project failure resulting from the three domains of organizational conflict, and identifies lessons learned from the failure via a conflict management perspective. Lessons learned are presented to facilitate the management of interpersonal-based, task-based, and process-based conflicts on the part of project managers and project sponsors, thus increasing the likelihood of successful project management outcomes. This case study fills a void in the project management literature by examining the relationship between the three dimensions of organization conflict and the increase in various project costs, and then offering a Project-Conflict Management Framework.
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Extract
How Not to Manage a Project: Conflict Management Lessons Learned From a Dod Case Study
Introduction
Project management within the United States Department of Defense (DOD) has been aptly described as the one of the world's most complicated processes. Completion of projects may require several years, and they can be difficult to manage under the best of circumstances. If organizational conflict is superimposed upon the normal project management difficulties, successful project outcomes are rendered immensely more difficult. The complexity of DOD projects stems from the fact that various stakeholders from above and below are likely to besiege the project manager. From above, there are the senior financial executives whose jobs consist of constantly re-allocating resources. More specifically, they typically re-allocate funds that have been awarded to a project manager for his or her program. Within the DOD, the complexity also stems from the appearance or perception that there have been times when the re-allocation of funds has been done without any regard for national security or for those military missions that might be of strategic importance to the military.From below, there are the departmental or organizational managers who are vested in protecting their own interests in the project, whether directly or indirectly. Often times, these managers consider the authority and latitude for independent action accorded by senior DOD management to the project manager to be an encroachment upon their authority. Along with this, such departmental managers are concerned with preserving their own organizations, and therefore attempt to compel the project manager to comply with each and every regulation pertaining to their separate areas. This was especially true in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the emphasis in the DOD was on streamlining acquisition strategies to reduce the funding outlay and the time required for fielding a system. At the time the Lighter Amphibian Heavy-Lift (LAMP-H) Project, which will be described below, was extant, the time to field was typically 10 - 15 years, which continues to be an issue and a matter of concern (Griffard, 2002; Office of Inspector General, 2001). Departmental managers have been and still are concerned that any attempt to shorten the acquisition process represents a threat to their various areas, and are highly resistant to any approach to acquisition streamlining.Consequently, departmental managers do everything within their power to compel full compliance with all regulati...See the full content of this document
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