Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?

FreemanVol. 57 Nbr. 6, July 2007

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Summary


Morris Kleiner, an economist who teaches at the University of Minnesota and is a visiting scholar in the economics department of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, takes a careful look at the issue in Licensing Occupations and comes to the conclusion that occupational licensing statutes do little or nothing to protect consumers, but do tend to raise the price of services. Kleiner makes it clear that the impetus behind occupational licensing is overwhelmingly the desire by professionals to control entry into their field, not a dispassionate analysis by public officials that citizens would be best served if they were forced to choose between doing business with a licensed, state-approved practitioner and either getting no service at all or attempting a do-it-yourself job.

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Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?

Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? by Morris M. Kleiner W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research * 2006 * 181 pages * $40.00 hardcover; $18.00 paperback

Reviewed by George C. Leef

Cases of ridiculous occupation al licensing reg...

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