Summary
Another solid indicator of the true nature of [Donald Rumsfeld]'s legacy can be found in the files of the Government Accountability Office, the congressional investigative arm. Of the hundreds of GAO investigative reports devoted to the Defense Department on Rumsfeld's watch, 25 deal in some way with Iraq. The other 861 have tides that, in many cases, indicate that Iraq wasn't the only crisis crying out for Rumsfeld's attention. Some pull no punches ("DOD Wastes Billions of Dollars through Poorly Structured Incentives"); others are, intentionally or not, drolly understated ("Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters"). It's also hard not to be struck by the frequency with which subtle-yet-pointed phrases like "actions needed," "issues require attention," and "room for improvement" appear. ("Oversight," for example, often appears in contexts that indicate a marked lack of the practice.)
This is particularly true for the Pentagon's business operations. Though hardly as attention catching or viscerally provocative as Iraq, how the Pentagon spends and accounts for its money may be the most critical component of national defense. Such is GAO's view, anyway. Alas, it's not one Rumsfeld has cared much about. The result, according to GAO, has been ruinous, with "billions of dollars provided to DOD wasted each year because of ineffective performance and inadequate accountability." Indeed, not one "military service or major defense component [can] pass the test of an independent financial audit because of pervasive weaknesses in financial management systems, operations, and controls." As David Walker, GAO's chief, noted in recent congressional testimony, his organization has repeatedly suggested that Rumsfeld create a new Pentagon post-that of chief management officer-to begin straightening all this out. Rumsfeld never obliged.The Post noted that not only did the transcript reveal that Rumsfeld could not explain "how his department came to nearly squander $30 billion leasing several hundred new tanker aircraft that its own experts had decided were not needed," but also that the secretary of defense couldn't explain why he didn't know. This was only one indicator of Rumsfeld's mismanagement. The paper further cited GAO chief Walker's statement to Congress earlier in the year that the Pentagon has "a long-standing track record of over-promising and under-delivering [weapons systems] with virtual impunity." The Post also reported the GAO had recently discovered that five new weapons systems already costing taxpayers well into the billions had been allowed to rack up cost overruns of almost 30 percent. "Some of the blame, Walker suggested, should be laid at Rumsfeld's office," the paper reported, "which does not seem to be pushing' for the dramatic overhaul of the Pentagon's system needs."See the full content of this document
Extract
Inheriting a Shambles at Defense
Few in Washington thought it would actually happen, but on November 8, there it was: a vaguely humbled-looking Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, finally being shown the door. As his increasingly McNamara-esque visage withdraws from the scene, all eyes turn to his nominated successor, Robert M. Gates, Texas A&M president and former George H.W. Bush CIA chief. Everyone seems acutely focused on one matter: how Gates will handle Iraq. But as critical and obvious as that issue is, it obscures an even more important reality: Iraq is really only a reflection of a larger institutional problem. On Rumsfeld's watch the Pentagon's perennial management and budget woes have gone from a mess to an utter shambles.
"Rumsfeld will have two l...See the full content of this document
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