In defense of excessive government.

Summary

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1998 Presidential Address

An excessive government may be desirable because it is the only way in which the public can attain what it needs in a realistic scenario. A minimal state can either be desirable or possible but not both. Special-interest groups which exercise influence in politics and government are both wanted and unwanted. The waste and excess which must be channeled to special interests are necessary for encouraging the desirable government actions. However, such waste and excess must be kept to a minimum by reducing the influence wielded by political interest groups.

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Extract

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In defense of excessive government.

1. Introduction

I don't have much practice defending government, and I certainly would not have written this article if it were going to be subjected to a rigorous review process. But because it will not be subjected to any review process, rigorous or otherwise, I have the opportunity to try something different and irritate almost everyone, and that is not an opportunity to be passed up.

In mounting a defense of excessive government, I risk annoying two groups of people with very different political perspectives. The first group consists of those who think the term "excessive government" is an oxymoron, or if they do recognize the possibility of excessive government, they certainly do not think it describes any democratic government. The second group consists of those with whom I have long identified, classic liberals working in the field of public choice who advocate if not a minimal government, certainly one that is limited far more than in any existing democracy. In writing this article, I kept anticipating the objections of the latter group and trying to guard myself against them. In this effort I have attempted to use arguments drawn from, and consistent with, the public choice perspective to make my case.

Before diving into the details of my defense of excessive government, I will outline briefly the main points. I recognize that we rely on government to do some pretty heavy lifting in the form of collective action that, although socially desirable, cannot be motivated by market incentives. Given the serious obstacles to efficient collective action, it should not be surprising that this action is typically performed poorly by government. Of course, the difficulty in carrying out collective action and the deficiencies in the political process are commonly used to make a strong case for restricting government to a very few functions that it can perform cost-effectively. Unfortunately, the very problems that make it desirable to impose effective constraints on government make it extremely difficult to do so.

The flaws inherent in political decision making force a crucial trade-off that philosophical discussions about the ideal role for government typically overlook, the trade-off between the desirability of preventing government from doing things it does poorly and the desirability of securing advantages that only government action can provide. Precisely because government is not very responsive to the general interest, we lack the control over it to get rid of all the inefficient government programs while keeping the efficient ones. "Washington Monument syndrome" is a political reality that public choice economists delight in pointing to,(1) but the implication of that reality is that to get government to provide things we want, like the Washington Monument, we will have to put up with excessive spending on other government activities that cost more than they are worth. Recognizing the full implications of having to...

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