Summary
Patterson notes that Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Marmor claims that Wittgenstein's concern with what following a rule consists derives from his conception of meaning. Morawetz states that the difference between having a practice and having factual knowledge can be explained by the distinction between losing the ability to use a certain tool and questioning a fact. Easterbrook says that Wittgenstein shows that no system of language can be self-contained and that meaning thus must depend in part on logical structure and understandings supplied by a community of readers.
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Extract
The Legal Implications of Wittgenstein's Treatment of Rule-Following in Philosophical Investigations
Hund claims that Wittgenstein's attempt to reduce abstract social rules to externally observable patterns of behavior emasculated his conception of a rule to the point of nonexistence.1 Evans holds that Wittgenstein demonstrated that some categories are not defined by a set of necessary and sufficient common features on the basis of which their members can be clearly distinguished from nonmembers. Wittgenstein describes the sim...
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