Dr. Frankenstein meets Lord Devlin: genetic engineering and the principle of intangible harm.
The Monist › Vol. 89 Nbr. 4, October 2006
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Dr. Frankenstein meets Lord Devlin: genetic engineering and the principle of intangible harm.
I. THE PROSPECT OF HUMAN REDESIGN
At some point in the future, we may be able to use sophisticated forms of biomedical technology to redesign and modify human bodies. It may become technologically feasible to make extensive changes to our body tissues and overall morphology. We may be able to redesign our organic functioning, including that of our complex neurophysiology (with its associated or supervenient mental states). If some of this can be done, we may find many reasons to redesign ourselves--or, more likely, the next generation of human beings. We may, for example, seek to increase the maximum human life span, to shape our psychological dispositions in accordance with some moral or prudential ideal, or to reconfigure our bodily structures and organs for increased functional efficiency. We may wish to enhance our athletic, perceptual, or cognitive abilities to a point beyond historical levels of human attainment. Indeed, we may wish to obtain entirely new abilities. While various technologies might be employed for these purposes, one approach would be to modify our DNA. For example, genetic engineers could attempt to incorporate into individual human genomes certain nucleotide sequences from non-human animals that have desired characteristics. Such radical prospects as this raise important questions about the limits of tolerance for the genetic engineering of human beings, or, indeed, for any other emerging technologies that we could use to redesign and transform ourselves. What, if any, regulatory constraints should be imposed on developments in human genetic engineering, or other relevant technologies? More fundamentally, what ethico-legal principles should be adopted by legislatures, or by agencies with delegated regulatory responsibility, when they consider what constraints to impose? In what follows, I first develop an expanded principle of intangible harm to society, but I then emphasize that it would be dangerous to adopt this as a justification for prohibitory laws. Finally, I make some suggestions as to how such a principle might be given some recognition, while hedging it about with appropriate safeguards. II. THE DIFFICULTY OF IDENTIFYING HARM An obvious difficulty is faced by advocates of legislative prohibitions, or other constraints, on human genetic engineering (though I refer to 'prohibitions', much of the argument applies to lesser constraints). Putting the matter rhetorically, just what harms are suffered by individuals whose bodies have been redesigned and technologically transformed? John Stuart Mill famously claimed that only the prevention of harm to others can just...See the full content of this document
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