New Developments in Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Jurisdiction

Summary

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[...] appellant must undergo the "clearing" process required under appropriate service regulations to separate him from military service.150 The key to this case was whether there had been a final accounting of pay before appellant's discharge was revoked.151 Whether there was personal jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed by appellate courts using a de novo standard.152 However, courts accept the military judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.153 Here there was no claim of factual error, and so the military judge's factual findings were accepted.154 The military judge found that there were at least seven steps required under DFAS and finance office procedures in order to effect a final accounting of pay.155 In Hart's case, only step one had been accomplished.156 The military judge also found that the local finance office had twenty days to complete the initial calculations and forward them to DFAS.157 Here the discharge was revoked well within the twenty day window.158 This was a 3-2 decision, with Chief Judge Effron and Judge Stucky dissenting.159 The thrust of the dissent was that the court's ruling makes it difficult if not impossible to know with certainty when a discharge has become effective.160 Even though a servicemember has received a valid DD 214, and completed final outprocessing, including the finance office, they still are not completely released from military status until such time as their final pay is calculated and ready for delivery.161 It is important for Judge Advocates to recognize the continued validity of the three requirements from King: delivery of a valid DD 214, final accounting of pay, and a clearing process.162 However, it is equally important for Judge Advocates to recognize that this was a split decision (3-2), where one vote could cause a different result in a future case.

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New Developments in Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Jurisdiction

Introduction

This year's Sixth Amendment and jurisdiction cases do not break new ground as much as they simply confirm our understanding of the law. In United States v. Pack, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) decided Maryland v. Craig1 remains the standard for permitting the live remote testimony of a child witness.2 In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court interpreted the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine consistently with the language of Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 803(6).3 In United States v. Hart, the CAAF used the existing standard to determine when personal jurisdiction over servicemembers comes to an end.4 One area where there is still uncertainty in Confrontation Clause law is the admissibility of lab reports, and this issue was addressed by the CAAF this term in United States v. Harcrow,5 and by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) in United States v. Blazier.6

This article begins with a brief overview of current Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, before considering two cases from last term that address the admissibility of lab reports in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington.7 Next, it covers Sixth Amendment cases that confirm our understanding of Confrontation Clause law. Finally, it discusses the single jurisdiction case decided by the CAAF last term, United States v. Hart, a case that adheres closely to established precedent, yet shows possible cracks in the foundation as a split decision.

Crawford Background

The law ...

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